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Abstract
The Gonzalez case is the latest in a growing series of cases that chip away at the Rule of
Non-Contradiction. The case, for all practical purposes, entailed a trial on the merits before the
extradition magistrate. This Article takes issue with Gonzalez and other cases that erode the Rule
of Non-Contradiction. Recognizing the fairness concerns that motivate deviation from the Rule,
this Article proposes a modification to it. Specifically, this Article proposes that courts adopt an
approach similar to that used in civil cases for deciding a motion for summary judgment. If the
accused’s evidence is such that no reasonable fact finder could disagree with it, then the court
should admit it, even if it provides a defense to the charges or contradicts evidence presented by
the requesting government.

THE RULE OF NON-CONTRADICTION IN
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS: A PROPOSED
APPROACH TO THE ADMISSION
OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
Jacques Semmelman*
INTRODUCTION
On the morning ofJune 30, 1998, three armed men robbed
a bank in Puebla, Mexico, taking cash and travelers checks. Six
months later, two brothers-in-law, Gonzalez and Huerta, were arrested in Louisiana while attempting to cash one of the stolen
travelers checks. Gonzalez and Huerta professed their innocence. Gonzalez claimed he had received the travelers checks
from a man in Mexico in exchange for Mexican pesos. The Government of Mexico demanded Gonzalez' and Huerta's extradition. The U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Louisiana
commenced an extradition proceeding against them in U.S. District Court.1
Gonzalez and Huerta made an application to be released on
bail, which in extradition cases is only available in "special circumstances." 2 The two suspects argued that special circumstances existed because the government would most likely fail to
establish probable cause that they had committed the crimes
charged, a sine qua non for certifying them for extradition. The
extradition magistrate4 conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
bail application.
The government's evidence at the bail hearing consisted of
* Member, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP. Former U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York. B.S. Columbia University, 1976; A.M. Harvard University,
1977, Ph.D. 1980, J.D. 1983. The author thanks Dora Straus, Associate, Curtis, Mallet-

Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, who provided excellent research assistance. The author also
thanks Murray Stein, Sara Crisciteli, T. Barry Kingham, and Prof. Abraham Abramovsky

for their helpful comments.
1. See In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999).
2. See id. at 735 (citing Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S. Ct. 781, 47 L. Ed. 948

(1903)).
3. Id. at 736.
4. The judicial officer who presides over an extradition hearing is called an "extradition magistrate," even if he or she is a U.S. District Court judge.
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an affidavit stating that three Mexican eyewitnesses (two police
officers and a bank employee) had identified the suspects from
single photographs faxed to Mexico by Louisiana police. As the
photographs were being shown to the witnesses, the witnesses
were informed that these men had been arrested while trying to
cash the travelers checks that had been stolen during the bank
robbery.- The extradition magistrate found the government's
evidence to 6be "highly suspect," improperly "suggestive," and
"unreliable." The extradition magistrate then permitted the
suspects to present an alibi defense at the bail hearing. Gonzalez and Huerta each testified, and called alibi witnesses as well.
The court found the accused and their alibi witnesses credible. 7
The court granted bail.8
Were this a domestic criminal case, these events would not
have been the least bit noteworthy. But In re Gonzalez9 was not a
domestic criminal case. It was part of an international extradition proceeding.
The Gonzalez case, in which the accused was permitted to
present a defense of alibi, albeit in the context of a bail hearing,
represents a radical departure from traditional extradition jurisprudence. International extradition proceedings in the U.S.
courts are governed by the evidentiary rule that the accused has
no right to present a defense to the charges against him,"° such
as an alibi defense," and has "no right to introduce evidence
which merely contradicts the demanding country's proof, or
which only poses conflicts of credibility."1 2 Moreover, under
5. Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 733-35, 737.
6. Id. at 737.
7. See id. at 741 (finding that accused "presented credible and persuasive evidence
that they were elsewhere on the date of the robbery and could not have perpetrated this
crime").
8. Id.
9. In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999).
10. Such as the defense of innocence, see Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 302
(2d Cir. 1981); duress, see In re Powell, 4 F. Supp. 2d 945, 958-59 (S.D. Cal. 1998);
insanity, see, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 457 (1913); orjustification, see, e.g., In
re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 986 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1894). The accused may, however, present a
defense expressly permitted by the applicable extradition treaty, such as, for example, a
defense that the crime charged is a non-extraditable political offense. See, e.g., Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
11. See, e.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978); Eain, 641 F.2d at
512; Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir. 1927); In re Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22379, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1996).
12. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Eain, 641 F.2d at
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traditional application of the rule, evidence that the requesting
government's witnesses later recanted their incriminating statements is not admissible in the extradition proceeding. 3 This Article refers to this rule as the "Rule of Non-Contradiction" (or
"Rule"). While U.S. courts have generally adhered to the Rule of
Non-Contradiction, Gonzalez can be viewed as the latest in a
growing line of cases that erode the Rule.
The Rule of Non-Contradiction permits the accused to introduce evidence of very limited scope. The accused may only
introduce evidence that "explains" the government's evidence,
i.e., that provides an innocent explanation for events that the
government contends point toward guilt. In particular, to the
extent that the government relies upon circumstantial evidence,
the accused is generally permitted to introduce evidence that
helps to explain it away.' 4
The Rule of Non-Contradiction has been described as

512; United States ex reL Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir.
1962); Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 690 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Messina v. United
States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984).
13. See Eain, 641 F.2d at 512 (refusing to admit evidence that accusing witnesses
later recanted their accusations); Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that recantation by accusing witness excluded since accused "has no
right to attack the credibility of [accusing witness] at this stage of the proceedings;
issues of credibility are to be determined at trial.").
14. See United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 118 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating
that accused permitted to "present an explanation for the loans and payments" alleged
by the government to have been bribes);Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057, 106465 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (allowing accused charged with embezzlement to offer evidence "to
explain the deposit of moneys in [his] account"); In re D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 92930 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (kidnapping case, where victim was held in shack on property
owned by accused, accused allowed to explain that shack was in remote area of large
property, and was rarely visited by accused); Na-Yuet, 690 F. Supp. at 1011 (kidnapping
case, accused entitled to offer evidence that would "explain [her] relationship with alleged accomplices and thereby account for her involvement with the ransom money,"
and evidence that would "explain [her] alleged 'flight' from" requesting country). See
also Order of United States Commissioner Richard S. Goldsmith dated Nov. 30, 1966,
M.S. Department of State, file PS 10-4 CAN-US, reprinted in 6 MARJORIE M. WHIMAN,
DIGSr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1008-10 (1968) (listing unreported case in which extradition magistrate concluded that accused "has satisfactorily explained" government's
proof and thereby defeated showing of probable cause). But cf. Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at
690 (stating bank fraud case, issue of what caused bank's failure was "a matter of circumstantial evidence," but given "substantial bodies of evidence" that would have to be
explored to reach conclusion on issue, extradition magistrate excluded evidence proffered by accused as "not truly 'explanatory' within the meaning of the authorities.").
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"somewhat murky."' 5 Courts applying the Rule have not drawn a
clear distinction between evidence that "explains" the government's proof and evidence that "contradicts" it.' 6 Indeed, courts
admit that the distinction is "difficult to articulate."' 7
The Rule of Non-Contradiction stems from the premise that
an extradition hearing is not a trial on the merits.'" Rather, it is
a probable cause hearing, wherein disputed issues of fact are not
resolved by the extradition magistrate. Instead, issues of fact are
left for trial in the requesting country. 19
Courts that give the Rule a strict interpretation hold that if
the requesting government's case includes the testimony of an
accomplice or other percipient witness, then that person's testimony must be deemed true for purposes of the extradition pro15. Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Peryea v. United
States, 782 F. Supp. 937, 940 (D. Vt. 1991); In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 740
(W.D. La. 1999).
16. See, e.g., Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 175 (Ist Cir. 1991) (noting that "the
line between 'contradictory' and 'explanatory' evidence is not sharply drawn"); In re
Schweidenback, 3 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (D. Mass. 1998) (same);Jhirad, 362 F. Supp. at
1064 ("[t]he law is somewhat unclear as to what evidence a fugitive can advance at the
hearing .... The line between an explanation and a contradiction is a narrow and
sometimes invisible one."); Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 782
(N.D. Cal. 1985) ("[c]ourts have struggled to clarify the distinction"); In re Singh, 124
F.R.D. 571, 573 (D.NJ. 1987).
17. See, e.g., Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 685 ("The distinction between 'contradictory
evidence' and 'explanatory evidence' is difficult to articulate."); Gill, 747 F. Supp. at
1044; In re Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
18. See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316, 42 S. Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 464 (1922);
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,461, 33 S.Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913); In re Orteiza y
Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337, 10 S.Ct. 1031, 34 L. Ed. 464 (1890); In re Wadge, 15 F. 864,
886 (1883); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Jhirad, 362 F.
Supp. at 1060; Gill, 747 F. Supp. at 1044.
19. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that
evidence that would merely create "a conflict of credibility" was properly excluded;
"such a contest" of credibility "should properly await trial in Israel"); In re Sandhu, No.
90 Cr. Misc. No. 1 (JCF), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7314, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1997)
("[piroof that [accused] have been victims of fabricated evidence in other cases certainly casts doubt on the truthfulness of witnesses proffered by the Indian government.
But that ultimate credibility determination must be made by the finder of fact at trial in
the requesting country."); Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
("[p]etitioner will have a full opportunity to challenge the credibility of his alleged
accomplices' confessions at a trial in Israel under the rules of evidence in that country
.. "); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[s]uch a contest should be
resolved at trial in Israel."); Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
("[t]he accused has no right.., to present evidence which.., poses a question of
credibility.").
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ceeding.2 ° Other courts are less deferential; while prohibiting
the accused from introducing evidence to contradict the government's proof, these courts subject the government's evidence to
careful scrutiny and even skepticism. 2 ' Prior to the 1999 Gonzaalibi
lez decision, no published U.S. court opinion had allowed
22
proceeding.
extradition
evidence in an international
Applied strictly, as it often is, the Rule of Non-Contradiction
leads to harsh results. Under the Rule, the credibility of even
the most disreputable government witness may not be impeached, and the testimony of even the most reputable defense
20. See In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1050-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[t]he primary
source of evidence for the probable cause determination is the extradition request, and
any evidence submitted in it is deemed truthful for purposes of this determination."
later proceedingAhmad, 726 F. Supp. at 399-400.); In re Pineda Lara, No. 97 Cr. Misc. 1
(THK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1777, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1998) ("[iun determining
whether probable cause exists, the Court assumes that the evidence contained in the
Request for Extradition is true."); Singh, 124 F.R.D. at 572 ("[d]efendants may not attack an affiant's credibility in this extradition proceeding"); In re Marzook, 924 F. Supp.
565, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("I must accept as true all of the statements and offers of proof
by the demanding state."); In re Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 795 n.6 (D. Conn. 1997)
(same).
21. See, e.g., Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
extradition magistrate has some latitude in assessing credibility and is not strictly bound
by face of government's affidavits); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir.
1986) ("[t]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is
solely within the province of the extradition magistrate."); Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F.
Supp. 877, 883 (N.D. Ohio 1959) ("the Court must scrutinize the evidence carefully to
determine at least a reasonable probability that the petitioner was guilty of the crime.");
Austin v. Healy, 5 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1993); In re D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 930
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 690 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980); Moghadam, 617 F.
Supp. at 782-84; Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Shapiro, 355 F. Supp. at 572.
22. The Gonzalez court cited two extradition cases in which it said "alibi evidence
was presented and considered." In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 739 (W.D. La.
1999). In one such case, United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1984), the
Eighth Circuit, upholding extradition, stated that the extradition magistrate was "quite
generous in permitting Wiebe to address the charges against him," but did not set forth
the manner in which the accused had done so, except to say that the accused
'presented no evidence, other than his own testimony..." W'ebe, 733 F.2d at 553. No
alibi evidence is mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion. The other case cited by
the Gonzalez court, Correll v. Stewart, No. 91-1009, 1991 WL 157246 (6th Cir. Aug. 16,
1991), is an unpublished opinion. Upholding extradition to Denmark, the Sixth Circuit summarized the evidence that established probable cause, which included the accused's "false exculpatory statements, [and] statements made by [the accused's] alibi
witness which were later retracted..." Correll,No. 91-1009, 1991 WL 157246. While the
opinion provides no more information than this about the "alibi witness," a fair reading
is that it was the government that introduced the fact that an alibi witness had initially
come forward to exculpate the accused, but had then retracted the alibi.
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witness may not be introduced to contradict the government's
evidence. Thus, the Rule severely limits the ability of the accused to challenge the government's evidence in support of
probable cause.
It is not difficult to see why a U.S. court might be troubled
by the Rule of Non-Contradiction, particularly when the accused
has compelling evidence that contradicts the government's
proof. The extradition magistrate is charged with protecting the
accused's due process rights, and the extradition hearing is the
primary vehicle through which the accused is accorded due process. 21 When an extradition magistrate is forced to exclude compelling exculpatory evidence proffered by the accused, the Rule
of Non-Contradiction creates the risk of a hearing that is fundamentally unfair.
Moreover, certain evidence is, on its face, so dispositive that,
in civil litigation, a court would be bound by it as a matter of
law.24 Surely if there were documentary, photographic, or other
unimpeachable evidence that completely refuted the requesting
government's proof, it might be difficult for a U.S. extradition
magistrate to disregard it entirely. At the same time, courts are
emphatic that an extradition hearing is not a trial. 25 Allowing
23. United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 1997)
("[e]xtradition proceedings before United States courts [must] comport with the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution"); Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1969)
("[t]he Due Process clause guarantees [the accused] the right to a hearing prior to
extradition."); Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1103 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding that accused received due process at extradition hearing and habeas corpus proceedings);
United States v. Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[this court recognizes that
serious due process concerns may merit review beyond the narrow scope of inquiry in
extradition proceedings.").
24. See, e.g., Colip v. Clare, 26 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1994); Archie v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 813 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Jackson v. Riley Stoker Corp., 57
F.RD. 120, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
25. See supra note 18; see also Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911). The
court stated that
[i] t is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all of the factititous niceties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time ....
[I]f there is presented.., such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to
make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding government requires his surrender.
Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 512; Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517, 36 S. Ct. 634, 60 L.
Ed. 1136 (1916); Webe, 733 F.2d at 553; Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 627
(9th Cir. 1984); Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999); Eain v. Wilkes,
641 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir. 1962).
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the accused to introduce contradictory evidence risks transforming the extradition hearing into a trial on the merits, a notion
fundamentally at odds with extradition jurisprudence in the
United States and elsewhere, 26 and in derogation of the terms of
U.S. extradition treaties.2 7 Thus, there is a tension between the
need to avoid a trial on the merits, and the risk that an accused
will be deprived of a fair hearing by the exclusion of exculpatory
evidence.
The Gonzalez case is the latest in a growing series of cases
that chip away at the Rule of Non-Contradiction. The case, for
all practical purposes, entailed a trial on the merits before the
extradition magistrate. 28 This Article takes issue with Gonzalez
and other cases29 that erode the Rule of Non-Contradiction.
Recognizing the fairness concerns that motivate deviation from
the Rule, this Article proposes a modification to it. Specifically,
this Article proposes that courts adopt an approach similar to
26. See WHITFmAN, supra note 14, at 998-1004 (citing statutes and case law following Rule of Non-Contradiction).
27. See, e.g., Bingham, 241 U.S. at 517. The Court held that
[i] t is one of the objects of [the extradition statute] to obviate the necessity of
confronting the accused with the witnesses against him; and a construction of
this section, or of the treaty, that would require the demanding government to
send its citizens to another country to institute legal proceedings would defeat
the whole object of the treaty.
Id. (emphasis added); Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 902 (quoting Bingham); In re Farez, 8 F. Cas.
1007, 1012 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) ("[s]uch a result would entirely destroy the object of
such treaties."); In re Wadge, 15 F. 864, 866 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 16 Fed. Rep. 332
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883)
[t]he result would be that the foreign government, though entitled by the
terms of the treaty to the extradition of the accused for the purpose of a trial
where the crime was committed, would be compelled to go into a full trial on
This would be in plain contravention of the
the merits in a foreign country ....
intent and meaning of the extradition treaties ...
Wadge, 15 F. at 866 (emphasis added); In re Orteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337, 36 S. Ct.
634, 60 L. Ed. 1136 (1890) (citing Wadge).
28. At the bail hearing in Gonzalez, the accused called, inter alia, the following witnesses: Gonzalez (an accused), whom the court expressly found to be "a credible witness"; Huerta (an accused), who testified he had not left the United States since 1989;
Huerta's sister, who testified that she was 75% certain that Huerta was babysitting her
children on the evening of the date in question; Huerta's employer, who testified he
was certain that Huerta was at work on the date in question, and who the court expressly found to be "a credible witness"; and two character witnesses, including Huerta's
priest, who testified he is "certain that Huerta is incapable of robbing a bank." In re
Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730-32 (W.D. La. 1999). The government objected to the
testimony as violative of the Rule of Non-Contradiction, but, for the most part, elected
not to cross-examine these witnesses. Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 729 n.4.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 70-195.
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that used in civil cases for deciding a motion for summary judgment. If the accused's evidence is such that no reasonable fact
finder could disagree with it, then the court should admit it, even
if it provides a defense to the charges or contradicts evidence
presented by the requesting government. Such evidence would
refute probable cause without requiring what is in essence a trial
before the extradition magistrate. 0 On the other hand, if the
accused's evidence is such that reasonable fact finders could disagree with it, then the Rule of Non-Contradiction should govern, and the extradition magistrate should leave the disputed issue for trial in the requesting country.

I. TE

EXTRADITION HEARING

Extradition proceedings in the United States are governed
by the applicable extradition treaty, statutes,3 ' and case law. To
secure an accused's extradition, the government must show, inter
alia, that the accused has been charged by the requesting government with one or more crimes that fall within the scope of
the applicable extradition treaty, and that there is probable
cause to believe that the accused committed the crimes
charged. 3 2 The extradition magistrate conducts a hearing to determine whether the government has established each of the elements needed for extradition, which includes a showing of probable cause. The probable cause hearing is comparable to a preliminary hearing in a domestic criminal case.3 3
30. Cf Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing defense
to introduce evidence that court in requesting country found co-conspirator's confes-

sion untrue and coerced; admission of evidence "comports with the purpose of the
limiting distinction between explanatory and contradictory evidence because it requires
the taking of no testimony requiring the extradition magistrate to weigh and choose
between contradictory stories.").
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Peroffv. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADInION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACrCE 703, 711-13
(1996). For a summary of extradition procedure in the United States, see generally,
Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquity in InternationalExtraditionProceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1198, 1201-03 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463, 8 S. Ct. 1240, 32 L. Ed. 234
(1888). The Court explained that

of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place every day
in this country before an examining or committing magistrate for the purpose
of determining whether a case is made out which willjustify the holding of the
accused.., to ultimately answer to an indictment, or other proceeding, in
which he shall be finally tried upon the charge made against him.
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The applicable statute3 4 requires the extradition magistrate
to determine whether the evidence is "sufficient to sustain the
charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention."- Thus, by its terms, the statute adopts, as the probable
cause standard in a given case, whatever standard is set forth in
the pertinent extradition treaty. Frequently, although not universally,-" U.S. extradition treaties provide that extradition may
only occur upon such evidence of criminality as would be sufficient to hold the accused for trial according to the laws of the
place where the accused is found. 7 Courts apply the federal
standard for probable cause:' "evidence sufficient to cause a
enperson of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously
39
guilt."
accused's
the
of
belief
tertain a reasonable
II. THE RULE OFNON-CONTRADICTION
A. Definition and Application of the Rule
The following is a frequently-cited formulation of the Rule
of Non-Contradiction:
Id.; accord Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1993); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d
167, 175 (2d. Cir. 1980); Peroff, 563 F.2d at 1102; United States v. Taitz, 134 F.R.D. 288,
289 (S.D. Cal. 1991).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1999).
35. Id.
36. Cf Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Swiss Confederation
and the Government of the United States of America, Nov. 14, 1990, entered into force
Sept. 10, 1997, S.Treaty Doc. No. 104-9, Art. 9, § 3(b) (explaining that evidence in
support of extradition request must include "a summary of the facts of the case, of the
relevant evidence, and of the conclusions reached, providing a reasonable basis to believe that the person sought committed the offense for which extradition is requested").
37. See BAsslouN, supra note 32, at 706 ("This is the traditional standard of probable cause which is embodied in most treaties.").
38. I&at 712; Sindona, 619 F.2d at 175; Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.
Supp. 777, 782 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
39. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See, e.g., United
States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Coleman); Moghadam, 617 F.
Supp. at 782; In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Gonzalez, 52 F.
Stpp. 2d 725, 736 (W.D. La. 1999); BAssiourI, supra note 32, at 724. However, with
respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause, some courts have
looked to the law of the state in the which hearing is taking place. See, e.g., In re Shapiro,
352 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("state law provides primary initial guidance in an
extradition proceeding"). Other courts have applied federal standards. See, e.g., Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981). See generally BAssIouNi, supra note 32, at 719,
731-35; see also Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956, 958-60 (1st Cir. 1976) (examining negotiating history of U.S.-Italy extradition treaty and concluding that treaty parties wanted
federal, not state standard to apply).
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An accused person's right to produce evidence at an extradition hearing is limited. The rule is that the accused has no
right to introduce evidence which merely contradicts the demanding country's proof, or which only poses conflicts of
credibility. On the other hand, the accused has the right to
introduce evidence which is "explanatory" of the demanding
country's proof. The extent of such explanatory evidence to
be received is largely in the discretion of the judge ruling on
the extradition request
The distinction between "contradictory evidence" and "explanatory evidence" is difficult to articulate. However, the
purpose behind the rule is reasonably clear. In admitting
"explanatory evidence," the intention is to afford an accused
person the opportunity to present reasonably clear-cut proof
which would be of limited scope and have some reasonable
chance of negating a showing of probable cause. The scope
of this evidence is restricted to what is appropriate to an extradition hearing. The decisions are emphatic that the extraditee cannot be allowed to turn the extradition hearing
into a full trial on the merits. 40
The precise scope of the Rule is within the extradition magis41
trate's "discretion."
Courts applying the Rule of Non-Contradiction have generally drawn a distinction between facts and conclusions. Unlike
inferences and conclusions, facts may not be contradicted.4 2 In
40. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978 (citations omitted).
41. Id.; see also Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963); Hooker
v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978). There is some authority to the effect that
the scope of the extradition magistrate's discretion extends even to allowing the accused to introduce contradictory evidence. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 552-53 ("the magistrate was quite generous in permitting" the accused to testify and to deny "any culpability or involvement in the crimes with which he was charged"); BAssIOUNI, supra note 32,
at 731 ("[T]he right of courts to bar evidence which merely contradicts probable cause
or which presents a different version of events remains discretionary, though it is usually excluded."). Cf Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing
cases). See alsoJohn G. Kester, Some Myths of United States ExtraditionLaw, 76 GEO. L.J.
1441, 1469-71 (1988) (characterizing Rule of Non-Contradiction as "myth," but acknowledging that "a United States court sitting for extradition will not allow a full-scale
defense to the merits of the case, because that is the function of the judicial authorities
abroad.").
42. See, e.g., United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 118 (1st Cir. 1997);
Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); In re D'Amico, 185 F.
Supp. 925, 929-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 690 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D.
Fla. 1988). But cf. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 690 (refusing to allow accused to chal-
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some cases, foreign governments have sought to take advantage
of the Rule by cloaking the conclusions of their own investigating magistrates' or other officials as "facts" that are not subject
to contradiction under the Rule.' For the most part, U.S. courts
have refused to rubber stamp conclusions of foreign investigators even when characterized as fact.45
The Rule is applied most easily at its extremes. For example, where the government relies upon accomplice testimony to
establish probable cause, 4 6 the accused may not call witnesses to
lenge conclusions of Italian investigators that accused's conduct caused banks' collapse).
43. See generally, 1 JOHN M. FEDDERS, et aL, TRANsNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACnCAL
APPROACHES TO CoNFucTs AND ACCOMMODATIONS 196-97 (1984). In European countries that utilize the inquisitorial system, investigations are conducted by investigating or
examining magistrates, who have broad powers, inter alia,to compel production of documents and testimony. Id. At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigating
magistrate issues a report that contains findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
which may include credibility determinations. Id.; see also In re Kasper-Ansermet, 123
FR.D. 622, 633-34 (D.N.J. 1990) (discussing role of investigating magistrate under Swiss
law).
44. See cases cited infra note 45.
45. See Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'ggranted,
124 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1997), op. withdrawn on other grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 877, 119 S. Ct. 179, 142 L. Ed.2d 146 (1998) (rejecting
government's argument that French investigating magistrate "should be presumed to
be reliable and that his reliability cloaks his allegations of fact with sufficient credibility
to establish probable cause, even in the absence of any showing of a basis for crediting
whatever evidence he relied upon."); In re Extradition of Sauvage, 819 F. Supp. 896, 903
(S.D. Cal. 1993) (refusing to accept the conclusions of French investigating magistrate;
extradition treaty "requires this court to make an independent determination from evidence as to probable cause"); In re Extradition of Ernst, No. 97 Crim. Misc. 1, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10523, at *2-24, 29 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (stating that even where defendant had already been convicted in absentia in Switzerland, that conviction "must be
regarded as only a charge and the government is required to make an independent
showing of probable cause to believe that [the accused] committed the offenses with
which he is charged"; extradition magistrate's determination of probable cause "cannot
be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others"); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629
F.2d 739, 743-44 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that extradition magistrate may not defer to
foreign magistrate's determination that arrest warrant should issue for accused);
United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1984) ("the record does not support
[the accused's] contentions that the magistrate failed to conduct an independent review of the evidence and merely 'rubber stamped' the Spanish indictment."); Bobadilla
v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (admitting expert testimony "as to the
unreliability of the Honduran reports on the blood and fibers .... The Court is persuaded by Petitioner's argument that the government's evidence concerning the blood
and fibers is incompetent due to lack of generally accepted scientific procedures.").
But cf. Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 688, 690 (giving "considerable weight" to "opinions" of
Italian bank examiners and liquidator).
46. The self-incriminating statements of accomplices can be sufficient to establish
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offer a contrary account 47 or to establish an alibi.4" The accused
may, however, offer evidence to explain the government's proof
without contradicting it.49 An example of explanatory evidence
is found in United States v. Lui Kin-Hong. 0 The accused was permitted to offer evidence to explain various payments that the
government alleged were bribes. The source, amount, and timing of the payments were not controverted in any respect, and,
under the Rule of Non-Contradiction, could not have been.
However, to the extent that the government was arguing that it
was reasonable to infer that the payments were in fact bribes, the
accused was allowed to introduce evidence that the payments
had an innocent explanation. 5'
B. Origin and Premises of the Rule of Non-Contradiction
The Rule of Non-Contradiction derives from the basic
premise that a probable cause hearing is not a trial on the merits. 2 In re Wadge53 is an early reported case that invoked a verprobable cause at an extradition hearing. See, e.g., Zanazanian v. United States, 729
F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1984); Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999);
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); In re Atta,
706 F. Supp. 1032, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Moreover, some courts have recognized that
accomplice testimony can be "of particular importance ... where all the alleged criminal activity occurred in a distant country." Eain, 641 F.2d at 510; accord, Atta, 706 F.
Supp. at 1051.
47. See, e.g., Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
("[T] he mere presentation of witnesses who testify as to an opposite version of facts will
not" affect probable cause determination; "[tlhe resolution of such conflicts in evidence must await a trial on the merits."); accord, Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617
F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 563, 572
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
48. See, e.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
932 (1978); Eain, 641 F.2d at 510; In re Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22379, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1996).
49. See, e.g., Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. at 781-82 ("the accused may produce evidence to explain matters, [but] the court may exclude evidence which merely contradicts government testimony, poses conflicts of credibility or establishes a defense") (citing cases) (emphasis in original); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057, 1064-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 690 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1988); In re
D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 929-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
50. United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997).
51. The accused's explanation was that the payments were merely gifts made by a
grateful business associate for having introduced a lucrative business relationship several years earlier. The court, however, elected not to believe the accused's explanation,
finding it "inherently implausible." Id. at 119.
52. See supra and infra notes 18-19, 25, 40, 55, 60, 69, and accompanying text.
53. In re Wadge, 15 F. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
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sion of the Rule of Non-Contradiction. The accused was sought
for extradition by the United Kingdom on a charge of forgery.
The accused sought a stay of the extradition hearing so that he
could secure alibi evidence in the United Kingdom. The extradition magistrate refused to issue the stay, and certified the accused for extradition. The district court denied the accused's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 4 Rejecting the accused's argument that he should have been accorded a stay to obtain and
present evidence in his defense, the court wrote:
If this were recognized as the legal right of the accused in
extradition proceedings, it would give him the option of insisting
upon a full hearingand trial of his case here; and that might compel
the demandinggovernment to produceall its evidence here, both direct
and rebutting, in order to meet the defense thus gatheredfrom every

quarter. The result would be that the foreign government,
though entitled by the terms of the treaty to the extradition
of the accused for the purpose of a trial where the crime was
committed, would be compelled to go into a full trialon the merits
in a foreign country, under all the disadvantagesof such a situation,

and could not obtain extradition until after it had procured a
conviction of the accused upon a full and substantial trial
here. This would be in plain contravention of the intent and meaning of the extradition treaties, which are designed to secure a trial in
the country where the crime was committed, through the extradi-

proof, according to our
tion of the accused, upon sufficient
55
law, to justify a commitment here.
The Wadge holding was endorsed by the Supreme Court in
1890.56
54. An extradition magistrate's certification of extraditability is not appealable; the
accused may obtain limited review by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with
the district court, and may appeal denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals. See,
e.g., Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369, 40 S. Ct. 347, 64 L. Ed. 616 (1920); Bovio v.
United States, 989 F.2d 255, 257 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993).
55. Wadge, 15 F. at 866 (emphasis added).
56. See In re Orteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337, 10 S. Ct. 1031, 34 L. Ed. 464

(1890). In Orteiza, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an extradition magistrate's refusal

to allow the accused, sought for embezzlement by the Government of Cuba, to introduce documentary evidence in his defense. The accused had managed to have the
documents certified by the U.S. consul general in Cuba, and sought to invoke a statute,
Sec. 5 of Act of Aug. 3, 1882, c. 378, 22 Stat. 216 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3190 (1999)), that said that any properly certified document would be received in
evidence at the extradition hearing. The Supreme Court held that the statute was intended solely for the benefit of the requesting government, and could not be invoked
by the accused. The opinion revolved around the application of the statute, and did
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The current formulation of the Rule of Non-Contradiction
began to take shape in Charlton v. Kelly.
In Charlton, the
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of "impressive evidence of
the insanity of the accused," 8 stating: "[t] o have witnesses produced to contradictthe testimony for the prosecution is obviously
a very different thing from hearing witnesses for the purpose of
explaining matters referred to by the witnesses for the Government."5 9 The Court grounded its rationale for the ruling on the
tenet that an extradition proceeding "is not a trial. The issue is
confined to the single question of whether the evidence for the
State makes a prima facie case of guilt sufficient to make it
' 60
proper to hold the party for trial
The Supreme Court further developed the Rule of NonContradiction in Collins v. Loisel.61 There, the Court, citing
Wadge and Charlton,rejected the accused's argument that the extradition magistrate had improperly excluded defense evidence,
stating that "Collins was allowed to testify ... to things which
might have explained ambiguities or doubtful elements in the
prima facie case made against him. In other words, he was permitted to introduce evidence bearing upon the issue of probable
62
cause. The evidence excluded related strictly to the defense."
The Rule of Non-Contradiction has impacted U.S. international relations. In the Insull case,6 3 the United States demanded that an individual accused of various financial crimes,
including fraud, be extradited from Greece. In the extradition
proceeding in Greece, the court received evidence introduced
not expressly state that the accused could not under any circumstance introduce evidence that would contradict the requesting country's proof. The Court explicitly endorsed, however, the district court's decision in Wadge. Orteiza, 136 U.S. at 337.
57. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 33 S.Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913).
58. Id. at 457.
59. Id. at 461 (emphasis added). The Court found support for this distinction in
an early circuit court case, United States v. White, 28 F. Cas. 588 (C.C.D. Pa. 1807) [No.
16, 6857]. In White, the court delineated the scope of a preliminary examination in a
domestic criminal case as follows: "the defendant's witnesses are not examined ...
[but] the judge may examine witnesses who were present at the time when the offense
is said to have been committed, to explain what is said by the witnesses for the prosecution ..." White, 28 F. Cas. at 588 (emphasis added).
60. Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461.
61. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 42 S.Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 956 (1922).
62. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
63. Decision on the Application of the United States of America for the Extradition of Samuel Insull, Sr., Decision No. 119/1933 (Greek Court of Appeals, Oct. 31,
1933), translated and reprinted in at 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 362 (1934).
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on behalf of the accused, and concluded that the accused lacked
the intent to defraud.64 Extradition was denied.
The U.S. Department of State protested to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, complaining that "it is evident that the
authorities attempted actually to try the case instead of confining
themselves to ascertaining whether the evidence submitted by
the U.S. Government was sufficient to justify the fugitive's apprehension and commitment for trial."" The U.S. Department of
State went on to say that it "considers the decision utterly untenable and a clear violation of the" extradition treaty between the
two countries.66 As a result of the Insull case, the United States
formally denounced its extradition treaty with Greece."
The importance of abiding by the Rule of Non-Contradiction was further underscored in connection with a 1961 U.S. extradition proceeding against former dictator Marcos Perez
Jimenez of Venezuela, sought by Venezuela for various financial
and other crimes committed during his regime.6" U.S. Secretary
of State Dean Rusk responded to a request from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy concerning the scope of evidence to be
allowed at the extradition hearing. The Secretary of State informed the Attorney General of the Rule of Non-Contradiction,
and explained:
There are sound practical reasons for this rule. As a general
matter, the determination of whether an individual has violated the laws of a country should and can best be made by
the courts of that country and in that country where, in the
usual case, the acts alleged to be criminal were committed
and where the evidence, for both the prosecution and the
defense, is most readily available. To accomplish this, this
country has entered into extradition treaties and conventions
with certain countries in which it obligates itself to surrender,
64. See Charles Cheney Hyde, The ExtraditionCase of Samuel Insull, Sr., In Relation to
Greece, 28 AM.J. INrT'L L. 307, 311 (1934).
65. See id. at 311 (quoting U.S. Department of State Press Release dated Nov. 5,

1933).
66. Id.
67. See WnrrEMiAN, supra note 14, at 1002. The dispute was resolved in 1937 when
the two governments signed a Protocol under which it was agreed that, under the
treaty, "the court or magistrate considering the request for extradition shall examine
only into the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by the demanding government to
justify the apprehension and commitment for trial of the person charged .... " Id. at
1002-03.
68. SeeJimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962).
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when a proper case is made out under the treaty or convention, individuals in this country who stand charged with or
convicted of crimes in the other country. Reciprocally, the
other country undertakes a corresponding obligation with respect to fugitives from justice of the United States found in
that country.
Of course, the effectiveness of the extradition treaty system
depends on how these treaties are interpreted and implemented. Should an accused in an extradition case, either in
this country or the other country concerned, be allowed to
present evidence in defense, the requesting country would
likely be forced to produce further and rebutting evidence
unless it wished to abandon the extradition entirely. It seems
clear that this procedure inevitably would lead to what we believe is quite clearly not contemplated by Congress, the
courts, or the Executive under our treaties and laws nor, in
fact, by the parties to the extradition treaty; that is, a full scale
trial of the accused in the requested country....
The proper interpretation and implementation of the extradition agreements and the statutes affects not only the ability
of this Government to fulfill obligations under the applicable
treaty or convention with a foreign Government, but also its
ability to obtain the benefits of such agreements. The manner in which this Government interprets and executes an extradition agreement with a foreign country will doubtless afrequests the United
fect the treatment given extradition
69
States makes to that country.
III. INROADS INTO THE RULE OF NON-CONTRADICTION
While U.S. courts have consistently endorsed the Rule of
Non-Contradiction in principle, they have varied with respect to
its practical implementation. As shown below, some courts have
sought ways to alleviate the harshness of the Rule. Certain
courts have simply ignored the Rule. For example, in United
States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 70 the accused was charged by
the Government of Yugoslavia with war crimes, including mass
murder, committed during World War II. The extradition mag69. Letter from Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, to Robert Kennedy, Attorney
General (Apr. 20, 1961), reprinted in WHrrEmAN, supra note 14, at 999-1000.
70. United States ex reL Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
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istrate permitted the accused to present "live witnesses" who "testified that the [government's] affiants were not telling the
truth.""' The court did not discuss or acknowledge the Rule of
Non-Contradiction.7 2 The extradition magistrate denied extradition, finding both a lack of probable cause and that the alleged crimes were protected, non-extraditable political offenses.7 3
Many years later, the government renewed its extradition request, and this time extradition was granted.74 The earlier decision has been described by the Seventh Circuit as "one of the
most roundly criticized cases in the history of American extradition jurisprudence, " 7 primarily for its ruling that World War II
atrocities were non-extraditable political offenses.
Another case with political overtones was a 1959 case,
Argento v. Jacobs.76 In 1931, the accused had been convicted in
absentia in Italy on a charge of murder. The accusing witnesses
later recanted their testimony, claiming they had been coerced
by officers of the fascist regime that ruled Italy at the time. Years
later, the Government of Italy demanded extradition. The extradition magistrate certified the accused for extradition. The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, relying heavily on the
recantations and the allegations of coercion. Again, the court
did not discuss or acknowledge the Rule of Non-Contradiction.
The first reported case that purported to apply the Rule,
71. Id. at 390.
72. Id. The court cited Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 42 S. Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 956
(1922), and Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 33 S. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913), see
supra text accompanying notes 57-62, only for the principle that at an extradition hearing probable cause is determined in accordance with the law of the state in which the
proceeding takes place. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. at 389. Cf. supra note 39.
73. Id. at 393. Most extradition treaties prohibit extradition for "political offenses." See Steven Lubet & Morris Czackes, The Role of the AmericanJudiciaryin the Extradition of PoliticalTerrorists,71J. CriM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 193 (1980). There is substantial
case law and a large body of literature concerning the "political offense exception." See,
e.g., CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIjNGAERT, THE POLrCAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADiTION (1980); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that Irish Repub-

lican Army attack on British army patrol, committed in furtherance of uprising in
Northern Ireland, was protected political offense); In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to find that armed attack by Abu Nidal terrorist on civilian
passenger bus was protected political offense).
74. In re Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal. 1985), stay denied, 784 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1986).
75. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 522 (7th Cir. 1981).
76. Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
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but in fact deviated from it, was the 1931 decision in In re Mertz."
The accused was a U.S. federal agent who was investigating narcotics trafficking near the U.S.-Canadian border. Working undercover with the knowledge and approval of Canadian law enforcement authorities, he arrested a drug dealer on the U.S. side
of the border, and later shot and killed him as he tried to escape.
The Government of Canada charged the agent with murder and
demanded his extradition. A disputed issue was whether the
shooting had occurred on U.S. or Canadian soil. The government offered eyewitness testimony that the shooting had occurred on the Canadian side of the border.7 8 Over the government's objection, the accused introduced evidence that the
shooting had occurred on the U.S. side.7 9 The extradition mag0
istrate admitted the accused's evidence, found it "convincing,"
and made a factual determination that the shooting had occurred on U.S. soil. 8 ' Finding that no crime had been committed in Canada, the court refused to certify the accused for extradition. 2 The court acknowledged the Rule of Non-Contradiction, but justified admission of evidence that the shooting had
occurred within the United States on the rationale that the evidence "explain[ed]" the government's proof.8 4
The facts of a related case highlight the political nature of
the Mertz decision. In Vaccaro v. Collier, 5 a different court certified for extradition the agent's informant, sought by the Government of Canada in connection with the same incident. Nevertheless, Secretary of State Cordell Hull refused to extradite the
informant.8 6 Explaining his decision to the Canadian Minister,
77. In re Mertz, 52 F.2d 241 (S.D. Tex. 1931).
78. Id. at 245.
79. Id. at 242.
80. Id. at 245.
81. Id. at 246.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 242-43.
84. Id. at 243.
85. Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 862 (D. Md. 1930) (issuing writ of habeas corpus
following extradition magistrate's certification of extraditability), af/d in part and rev'd
in part, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931) (overturning writ and allowing extradition to go
forward on certain charges). The informant was sought as an accessory to the murder,
and also for kidnapping another member of the drug ring. The court allowed extradition to go forward only on the kidnapping charge. Id.
86. The Secretary of State has full discretion whether or not to extradite. 18 U.S.c.
§ 3186 (1999). See, e.g., Emami v. District Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1453-54 (9th Cir.
1987); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980); Peroffv. Hylton,
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the Secretary of State cited the fact that Canadian law enforcement officials had approved of the undercover investigation and
had even congratulated their U.S. counterparts immediately after the incident."' The Secretary of State also noted the conflicting evidence as to where the shooting had occurred, and the
passage of four years between the shooting and the time the extradition request was made. 8
While Mertz has almost never been cited, a 1960 case, In re
D'Amico89 has been cited as authority by courts seeking to sidestep the Rule. The accused was charged by the Government of
Italy with kidnapping. The government's evidence consisted of
the inculpatory confessions of two alleged accomplices, both of
whom later recanted, and the fact that the victim had been held
in a shack on property owned by the accused.9" The extradition
magistrate certified the accused for extradition. Counsel for the
accused did not challenge probable cause at the extradition
hearing. 9 '
The accused then obtained new counsel, who challenged
92
of probable cause via habeas corpus review.
determination
the
The district court reopened the extradition hearing and remanded to the extradition magistrate for further proceedings on
the probable cause issue. The district court ruled that at the
hearing the accused would be permitted to offer explanatory evidence concerning the shack, namely, that it was located in a remote area of the accused's property where the accused seldom
ventured.93 The court ruled, consistently with the Rule of NonContradiction, that such evidence was being "offered to explain"
563 F.2d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977); Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527, 531
(D.C. Cir. 1974), af'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976).
87. See Note dated July 18, 1934 from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Canadian
Minister Herridge, MS Department of State, file 211.42 Vaccaro, Sarro/62, reprinted in
part in 4 GREEN HA wOOD HACKWORTH, DiGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 162-63 (1942);

see also JeffreyJ. Carlisle, Extradition of Government Agents as a Municipal Law Remedy for
State-Sponsored Kidnapping,81 CAuF. L. Rxv. 1541, 1568 (1993).
88. See HAcKwoRTH, supra note 87, at 163. There were also indications that the
request for extradition had only been made after the deceased's widow had been unsuccessful in attempts to negotiate compensation for her husband's death with the U.S.
Government. Vaccaro, 38 F.2d at 871.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

In re D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Id. at 928-29.
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 929.
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the government's proof, and was therefore admissible.9 4 The
court then turned to the two accomplice confessions. The court
noted that "[w]here, as here, such testimony has been completely recanted, its probative value is thin indeed, '9 5 causing
"grave doubt"9 6 that there was probable cause.
The recantation was part of the government's documentary
evidence, and, in a technical sense, was not being introduced by
the accused to contradict the government's proof. Nevertheless,
in instructing the extradition magistrate concerning the probable cause issue, the district court was expressly taking into account, and giving substantial weight to, evidence that contradicted the very essence of the government's proof-the inculpatory confessions. The court did this even as it was citing, and
purporting to apply, some of the leading cases on the Rule of
Non-Contradiction.9 7
After D'Amico, two decisions of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York abided by the Rule but inadvertently paved the way for the Rule's subsequent erosion. In
98 the accused was charged by the GovernShapiro v. Ferrandina,
ment of Israel with fraud. The allegation was that he and an
accomplice had set up an investment fund and had falsely represented to investors that their investments were guaranteed by a
bank.9 9 In support of probable cause, the government introduced the testimony of four witnesses who stated that the accused had made the false representations at issue.10 0 The accused sought to call other witnesses to testify, inter alia, that he
10
had not made the statements. '
The extradition magistrate refused to allow the contradictory evidence. On habeas corpus review, the district court agreed.
Reciting the Rule of Non-Contradiction, 0 2 the district court
went further, stating:
94. Id. at 930.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 931.
98. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 563, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
99. Id. at 571.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 572.
102. See id. "the fugitive has a right to introduce evidence ...limited to testimony
which explains rather than contradicts the demanding country's proof...." (quoting
United States ex re. Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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While the process of definition is difficult in the area of
"probable cause" perhaps it is enough to say that what tends
to obliterate probable cause may be considered but not what
merely contradicts it. The improbability or the vagueness of
testimony may destroy the probability of guilt, but the tendering of witnesses who testify to an opposite version of 0the
3 facts
does not. The latter must await trial on the merits.'
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, stating that the district court had properly refused to allow the accused to introduce the evidence that he had not made the representations:
"[i] f allowed, such statements would in no way "explain"-or, as
the district judge put it, "obliterat"-thegovernment's evidence,
but would only pose a conflict of credibility. Such a contest, the
judge permissibly ruled, should properly await trial in Israel."' 4
The Second Circuit thus correctly understood the district
court's use of the word "obliterate" to be, in effect, a synonym
for "explain." Nothing in either the district court's opinion or in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests that either court
intended the term "obliterate" to describe a special case of evidence that "contradicts." To the contrary, both courts expressly
stated that a "conflict of credibility" would not "obliterate" the
government's case.' °5
In re Sindona'0 was the other Southern District of New York
case that inadvertently paved the way for subsequent erosion of
the Rule. Sindona had been charged by the Government of Italy
with engineering a massive fraud that led to the collapse of several banks. At the extradition hearing, Sindona did not dispute
the fact that there had been substantial transfers of funds from
the banks to his companies.' 0 7 He sought to introduce evidence,
inter alia, that the transfers were duly authorized loans, and that
the collapse of the banks had not been caused by his actions but
by other circumstances. 0 8
Invoking the Rule of Non-Contradiction, the extradition
magistrate refused to admit Sindona's evidence. Although the
proffered evidence was arguably "explanatory," the court limited
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

i. (emphasis added).
Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
Id.; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 563, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 684-85.
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"explanatory evidence" to "reasonably clear-cut proof which
would be of limited scope and have some reasonable chance of
negating a showing of probable cause.... [T]he extraditee cannot be allowed to turn the extradition hearing into a full trial on
the merits." 109 After summarizing Sindona's "extensive" 110 and
highly complex offer of proof,"' the court concluded that
"Sindona's offer of exculpatory proof does not fall within the
area of 'explanatory' evidence contemplated by the cases.
Sindona's contentions raise issues appropriate for presentation
at a full trial in Italy; but they do not negate the probable cause
showing of the Italian government .... 1 1 2
The court in Sindona thus intended to reduce, not increase,
the scope of evidence that may be offered by an accused in an
extradition proceeding. Although Sindona proffered evidence
that was arguably "explanatory" of the government's proof, the
fact that it was not also of "limited scope" 113 and "reasonably
clear-cut"" 4 precluded its admissibility. By introducing the word
"negate" into the formulation of the Rule of Non-Contradiction,
the Sindona court was restricting, not expanding, the rights of
the accused, by limiting the admissibility of explanatory evidence. Nothing in the opinion remotely suggests that the court
was expanding the accused's right so as to allow introduction of
contradictory evidence that "negates" probable cause.
Prior to the Shapiro decision," 5 courts had not used the
word "obliterate" in connection with the Rule of Non-Contradiction. Prior to the Sindona decision, 1 6 courts had not used the
word "negate" in connection with the Rule. Since those decisions, however, many courts have adopted and incorporated the
word "obliterate,"" 1 7 or "negate,"118 or both," 9 into their formu109. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
110. Id
111. Id. at 685-87.
112. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 685.
114. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
117. See, e.g., Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(citing Shapiro); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Shapiro), aj]'d sub nom. Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1207 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999) ("evidence that explains away or completely obliterates probable cause is the only evidence
admissible at an extradition hearing."); Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 104041
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that expert testimony proffered by accused "would not serve
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lations of the Rule of Non-Contradiction.
Until 1985, no reported opinion concluded that contradictory evidence proffered by an accused was admissible because it
"negated" or "obliterated" probable cause. The opinion in Republic of France v. Moghadam,120 marks the first time an extradition magistrate refused to certify an accused for extradition on
the ground that the accused's proffered contradictory evidence
"negated" the government's showing of probable cause. 1 2 1
The accused, Moghadam, was sought for narcotics offenses.
A certain Custer had been arrested at the airport in Paris and
found to have heroin and opium in her luggage. She was carrying a letter that implicated Moghadam, a convicted drug
dealer,

22

23
She told the French inin the smuggling attempt. 1

vestigating magistrate 124 that Moghadam had arranged for her to
transport the narcotics and deliver them to him in San Francisco.'

25

She claimed that at some point during her journey, she

to 'explain' or 'obliterate' the government's evidence, so much as to pose a conflict in
the testimony of two handwriting experts"); In re Powell, 4 F. Supp. 2d 945, 959 (S.D.
Cal. 1998) (stating that accused is "foreclosed from raising the defense of duress in the
extradition hearing, as the defense is more appropriately offered before the court of
jurisdiction."); In re Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 923-24 (S.D. Cal. 1994) ("it has been held
appropriate to permit evidence that tends to obliterate probable cause"); In re Greer,
Misc. No. 91-90, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19515, at *15-16 (D. Vt. Nov. 20, 1991) ("Explanatory evidence is evidence that 'obliterates' probable cause, not merely contradictory
evidence.") (citing Shapiro); In re Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22379,
at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1996) (citing Shapiro); In re Sandhu, 90 Cr. Misc. No. 1, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7314, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1997) (citing Shapiro).
118. See, e.g., Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 175 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Sindona);
In re Schweidenback, 3 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing Sindona); In re
Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 795 (D. Conn. 1997) (citing Sindona); Lindstrom v. Gilkey,
No. 98 C 5191, 1999 WL 342320, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1999) (citing Sindona).
119. See, e.g., Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("[E]xtraditee cannot avoid extradition simply by contradicting the requesting country's case. Rather, the extraditee must 'negate' or 'obliterate' the requesting country's
showing of probable cause.") (quoting Cheng); In re Ntakirutimana, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22173, at *78 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1998) (quoting Cheng); Martin v. Warden, 804 F.
Supp. 1530, 1533 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (quoting Cheng), afftd, 993 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1993);
Ludecke v. Marshal, 15 F.3d 496,499 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting accused's argument that
"their evidence in opposition to the request for extradition negated and obliterated all
the allegations made by the German government").
120. Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
121. Id. at 783.

122. Id at 784.
123. Id. at 778.
124. See supra note 43 for a brief discussion of the role of investigating magistrates
in certain countries.
125. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. at 778.
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1 26
had called Moghadam from a hotel to report that all was well.
Telephone records confirmed that Custer had called a phone
number belonging to Moghadam's brother-in-law. 27 From a
French prison, Custer wrote a letter to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration ("D.EA.") offering to provide evidence
against Moghadam if she were transferred from the French jail
28
to a U.S. jail.'
The Government of France requested that the United States
extradite Moghadam to France for his role in the importation.
The U.S. Attorney in San Francisco commenced an extradition
proceeding. At the extradition hearing, Moghadam sought to
introduce evidence that Custer had later written a letter recanting the accusation made in her letter to the D.E.A.' 29 Custer
had subsequently withdrawn the recantation and had reasserted
the original accusation.'
Citing D'Amico for the proposition that an extradition magistrate could take into account "the fact that testimony against
the defendant was recanted by the witness,"'
the court stated
that "[t]he most significant aspect of the probable cause determination is Custer's recantation letter which was later withdrawn."'1 3 2 Analyzing the facts surrounding Custer's accusation,
recantation, and re-accusation, the court concluded that
"Custer's recantation appears to have more indicia of reliability
than the original accusations."' 3 The court based this conclusion largely on the fact that the accusations were "self-serving"
and had been motivated by Custer's stated desire to be transferred out of the French jail, whereas the recantation worked
34
directly against that interest.1
The court acknowledged the Rule of Non-Contradiction,
but stated that Custer's recantation went beyond "the mere pres-

126. Id.
127. Id, at 779 n.2. At the extradition hearing, the accused was properly permitted
to offer evidence explaining that Custer's fiance worked for the accused's brother-inlaw and often received calls at that number. Id.
128. Id. at 779.
129. See id. at 780 ("[T]he government never brought the recantation letter to the
attention of the court or the defendant.").
130. Id131. Id at 783.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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entation of witnesses who testify as to an opposite version of the
facts."'8 5 Here, according to the court, the recantation "negate[d]
the only evidence of probable cause.' 3 6 Concluding that the
government had failed to establish probable cause, the court denied extradition.
Moghadam was the first reported case in which a court,
though purporting to adhere to the Rule of Non-Contradiction,
contrasted the credibility of an accusation, offered by the government, against that of its recantation, offered by the accused,
and denied extradition on the ground that the recantation evidence was more credible than the accusation evidence.
Moghadam thus represents a significant departure from the Rule
of Non-Contradiction, despite the court's striving to characterize
its holding as consistent with the Rule by emphasizing the complete negation of probable cause.' 3 7 Ironically, the "negation" aspect of the Rule originated with Sindona, where the court used
the phrase with the intent to reduce, not increase, the right 3of8
the accused to introduce evidence at an extradition hearing.1
Two subsequent cases, In re Contreras" 9 and Maguna-Celaya
v. Haro,140 rely upon the breakthrough established in Moghadam.
In both cases, witnesses made confessions that inculpated the accused, and later recanted them. In both cases, the courts found
that the recantations contained greater indicia of reliability than
the original accusations, and, as result, ruled that the recantation evidence negated probable cause.
In Contreras, eleven witnesses had been arrested in a house
containing illegal firearms. They each signed a statement, prepared for them by Mexican police, inculpating the accused as
the supplier of the weapons. Pursuant to Mexican procedure,
two days later the witnesses were brought before a Mexican
judge, where they were asked to affirm their statements. At that
time, all eleven recanted their accusations. The witnesses
claimed that they had been threatened and physically coerced
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
F.3d 883
(1999).

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 109-15.
In re Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd mem., 172
(11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 410, 145 L. Ed.2d 320
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141

into signing the statements.
At the extradition hearing, the government relied upon the
eleven accusatory statements to establish probable cause. The
defense sought to introduce evidence of the recantations, as well
as evidence that physical coercion had been brought to bear
against the eleven witnesses in order to induce them to sign the
accusatory statements. 1 42 The extradition magistrate acknowledged the Rule of Non-Contradiction, noting that evidence "explaining away or completely rebutting" probable cause is admissible, while evidence "that merely controverts the government's
143
probable cause evidence, or raises a defense.., is excluded."
The court identified the issue before it as "whether recantation
testimony is deemed rebutting or explanatory which would be
admissible since it explains away or destroys the existence of
probable cause."" 4 Citing Sindona for the principle that evidence "negating" probable cause is admissible, 4 and Moghadam
for the principle that "recantation evidence rebutting probable
cause" is admissible, 4 6 the court concluded that
where the indicia of reliability is on the prior inculpating
statement, then a recantation, if admitted, would not negate
the existence of probable cause; or if the recantation only
controverted a prior inculpating statement, then it would not
rebut the probable cause evidence. However, where a prior
statement is shown to be coerced and the indicia of reliability
is on the recantation, then the subsequent statement negating
the existence of probable cause is gennane.' 4 7
The court ruled that, in light of the immediate and uniform
48
recantation by all eleven witnesses, as well as other facts,
141. Contreras,800 F. Supp. at 1466-68.
142. Id
143. Id at 1464.
144. Id. at 1465.
145. Id. at 1464.
146. Id. at 1469.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1468. These facts included that the retractions occurred in open court
at ajudicial hearing in Mexico, where the witness is required to "declare" that his statement or confession is accurate and then "adopt" it before the court. Id. at 1466. The
court noted that the witnesses "took the first opportunity to retract the prior statements, knowing that they may have subjected themselves and their families to retribution." Id. at 1468. Also, the original confessions were not written in the form of first
person narratives. Rather, they were "affidavits" from the Mexican officials who were
present when the statements were made. Id at 1465. Thus, "the incriminating state-
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"[a]ny indicia of reliability would be on the subsequent retractions" rather than on the original accusations. 4 9 Extradition was
denied.
The facts of Maguna-Celayav. Haro'5 0 are arguably less compelling for the accused than those in Contreras, but the outcome
in the district court was the same. 15 1 The accused was sought by
the Government of Spain in connection with various acts of vio5 2 The governlence allegedly committed by Basque separatists.'
ment's evidence in support of probable cause consisted of the
confessions of four individuals, each inculpating the accused.
One of the four had recanted the confession within a day. The
other three had waited almost nine years before claiming, after
for the accused, that they had been
being contacted by counsel
5
confessing.1
into
coerced
Citing the Rule of Non-Contradiction, the extradition magistrate noted that the recantation evidence presented a conflict
5 4 The extradition
that could only be resolved at trial in Spain.'
magistrate found that the government had established probable
5 The accused
cause and certified the accused for extradition.
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Citing Shapirofor the principle that the accused was entitled
to "obliterate" probable cause,' 5 6 and Contrerasfor the principle
that the accused may "obliterate" probable cause by showing that
ments were not of the [witness'] own making, but were pre-written statements that only
required his signature." Id. at 1468. At the declaration hearing in Mexico, the 11 witnesses variously testified that parts of the written confessions were not contained in the
statements as originally signed by them; that they recognized their signatures on the
confessions, but not the written contents, or, alternatively, that the written contents
were untrue; and that they were not permitted to read the documents that they were
forced to sign. Id. at 1466-68. Finally, the court noted that the facts, if true, showed
that the 11 had been physically coerced and tortured into giving their confessions. Id.
at 1468.
149. Ia. at 1469.
150. Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
151. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. See infra text accompanying notes 163-168.
152. Maguna-Celaya, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-39.
153. I. at 1344.
154. See id. at 1341 (citing magistrate's Order Certifying Extradition). Although
not reflected in the published opinion of the habeas corpus judge, the extradition magistrate alternatively found that the recantations were not sufficiently reliable to undermine the earlier statements. Id. This finding formed the basis for the Eleventh Circuit's subsequent reversal of the district court. Maguna-Celaya v. Reno, Slip Op., No.
98-5604 (11th Cir. Feb. 4, 1999). See infra text accompanying note 163-68.
155. Maguna-Celaya, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
156. Id. at 1343.
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the government's evidence was obtained via coercion, 57 the district court granted the writ of habeas corpus. 15 8 The court found
that "the evidence favors reliability of the recantations over that
of the original statements,"'5 9 and "completely negates the existence of probable cause." 160 The court then went even further,
and formulated a new exception to the Rule of Non-Contradiction:
When all the evidence presented by the Government in an
extradition proceeding is credibly tainted, thereby obliterating
probable cause, ... the burden should shift to the Government to come forward with independent evidence that the
relator committed the crimes charged. Such a rule would
protect the Court's
preeminent duty to guard against due
161
process violations.
The government appealed from the order issuing the writ
of habeas corpus."6 2 The Eleventh Circuit reversed.16 3 In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled that, "[a]ssuming
arguendo"'64 the evidence of coercion and recantation could be
considered in an extradition proceeding, the habeas corpus
judge had failed "to afford the appropriate deference" to the factual findings of the extradition magistrate. 1 65 The extradition
magistrate, while concluding that the recantation evidence was
"likely inadmissible,' 66 held that, in any event, "the recantations
were not sufficiently reliable to undermine the witnesses' earlier
statements."1 67 The habeas corpus judge was not entitled to
68
make a de novo factual determination.1
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1344.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 478 comment c (1987) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT"] (explaining that
government may not appeal from extradition magistrate's refusal to certify accused for
extradition, but may appeal from grant of writ of habeas corpus).
163. Maguna-Celaya, Slip Op., No. 98-5604.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
167. Maguna-Celaya,Slip Op. No. 98-5604, at n. 1.
168. It is well-established that the habeas corpus judge may not engage in de novo
fact-finding on the probable cause issue; rather, the scope of habeas corpus review of
that issue is limited to whether there is "any evidence" to support the finding of probable cause. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Demjanjuk v. Pe-
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Maguna-Celaya filed a certiorari petition with the Supreme
Court, and obtained a stay of extradition from Justice Anthony
1 69
The full
Kennedy pending determination of the petition.
170
outcome
the
while
Thus,
Court, however, denied certiorari.
in Maguna-Celayawas, in the end, favorable to the government,
the process that led to it contravened the Rule of Non-Contradiction.
The most extreme deviation from the Rule of Non-Contradiction took place in Gonzalez,'7 the case that introduces this
Article.172 In Gonzalez, the court held that alibi evidence "negating" probable cause is admissible in circumstances where the
Government's probable cause evidence lacks reliability and the
trovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 1985); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 790 (9th
Cir. 1986).
169. See Justice Blocks Basque Extradition,WAsH. NEws, Aug. 13, 1999.
170. Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, - U.S. , 120 S.Ct. 410, 120 L. Ed. 2d. 320 (1999).
In his certiorari petition, Maguna-Celaya argued that the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (or "Convention")
39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/506 (1984), entered intoforce Nov.
20, 1994, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as mod. 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter
"Convention"], prohibited consideration of evidence obtained by torture. See Justice
Blocks Basque Extradition,WAsH. NEws, Aug. 13, 1999. The Convention obligates signatory countries (now including the United States) to ensure that "any statement which is
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in
any proceedings..." Convention, supra, at art. 15. Some commentators have argued
that, as a result of the Convention, U.S. courts should refuse to consider evidence secured through torture. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Symposium on ParliamentayParticipation in the Making and Operation of Treaties: United States: The Role of the United States
Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. Rxv.
515, 520 (1991). However, when the U.S. Senate consented to ratification of the Convention, it specified in a special declaration that the Convention not be deemed "selfexecuting." 136 Cong. Rec. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). President Bill Clinton
ratified the Convention subject to the Senate's qualification that the Convention be
deemed non-self-executing. SeeJohn Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights
Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1213, 1229-30 (1996). Only when a treaty provision is selfexecuting does it vests individuals with legal rights enforceable in court. See Jacques
Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the FederalCourts: Making Sense of United States v.
Rauscher,34 VA. J. INT'L L. 71, 72-73 (1993). A non-self-executing treaty "is unavailing
to the litigant relying on it in court." Carlos M. Vasquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies
of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1121 (1992). Accordingly, the Convention may
not be invoked by an accused in a U.S. extradition proceeding as a basis for excluding
evidence allegedly elicited through torture. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2340B (1999)
(implementing Convention by creating federal crime of torture, and expressly disclaiming creation of "any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in
any civil proceeding."); 22 C.F.R § 95.4 (1999).
171. In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
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alibi evidence is credible and persuasive. 173 While the alibi evidence was admitted in the context of a bail hearing, the issue
was whether the government would likely meet its burden of establishing probable cause at the extradition hearing. By admitting alibi evidence in connection with this issue at the bail hearing, the court effectively was opening the door to alibi evidence
at the extradition hearing.
The court found the Government's probable cause evidence, which consisted of highly suggestive photo identifications, 174 to be unreliable. 7 5 The court permitted the defendants
to take the stand and also to call alibi witnesses, whom the court
found to be credible.' 7 6 The court concluded that the defendants had a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits at
the extradition hearing, and found that to be a "special circum77
stance" warranting release on bail.'
In analyzing whether it was proper to allow the defendants
to present alibi evidence, the court conducted an "exhaustive review" of case law involving alibi evidence at extradition hearings."7 8 The court attempted to distinguish the cases in which
alibi evidence was held inadmissible, on the ground that "each
involve[d] substantial probable cause evidence, unlike the instant case."' 7 9
Citing Contrerasand the district court's opinion in MagunaCelaya, the court stated, "[a]lthough the instant case does not
involve recantations of witnesses, it does involve a situation
where the reliability of the government's identification is in
question. In such a situation, the admission of evidence tending
to negate probable cause is equally valid ....,1 o The court held
that "[e]vidence of an alibi defense is... admissible if it negates
or obliterates probable cause... ")181
Gonzalez expands the holdings of Contreras and Maguna-Celaya to allow evidence of an alibi defense. The case stands for
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Gonza/Z, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
Id. at 737. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 733, 741.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 739 (citing cases).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
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the proposition that alibi evidence is admissible whenever the
government's probable cause evidence lacks reliability and
"undermines, or 'newhere credible alibi evidence exists that
1 2
gates' the existence of probable cause." 1
These cases-Moghadam, Contreras,Maguna-Celaya, and Gonzalez-are extremely problematic. Evidence of recantation does
not "explain" the government's case; it contradicts the government's case.'8 3 Evidence of recantation does not, to use the
Supreme Court's phraseology, "explain[ ] ambiguities or doubtful elements" in the government's proof.'8 4 Rather, it repudiates
the government's proof by calling it false. Alibi evidence likewise does not "explain" the government's case; it contradicts
it. 18 5 Because each of these reported cases' 8 6 entail credibility
182. Id. at 741.
183. See Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (excluding evidence
of recantation because "[t]he accused does not have the right to contradict the demanding country's proof"); affd sub nom. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir.
1981) ("[tlhe later statements do not explain the government's evidence, rather they
tend to contradict or challenge the credibility of the facts implicating petitioner").
184. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315 (1922).
185. Eain, 641 F.2d at 512 (holding that alibi evidence "directly contradicts the
government's proof" that accused committed crime charged on certain day); In re
Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22379, at *13 (D.NJ. Sept. 5, 1996)
("[T]he proffered evidence of alibi directly contradicts" the accusing witness' statement, and therefore "the Court must exclude this evidence from consideration.");
Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1927) (holding that alibi evidence
"would necessarily tend to contradict the testimony of [the government's) witnesses.").
186. Courts in other cases have considered evidence of recantation but have concluded, based upon the facts, either that recantation had not actually occurred, or that
the recantations were not reliable. See In re Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 923-24 (S.D. Cal.
1994) (finding, as factual matter, that witnesses had not recanted their accusations
"when first given the opportunity to recant and thus 'obliterate' their prior statements
and thus 'obliterate' probable cause, the co-conspirators did just the opposite, i.e., they
reaffirmed and adopted their prior statements almost in their entirety"); In re Mainero,
990 F. Supp. 1208, 1222, 1226 (S.D. Cal. 1997) ("The essential question is whether the
indicia of reliability is on the recantation or the initial statement"; finding, based upon
the facts, that "[t]he indicia of reliability is in favor of" the initial accusations "and not
their in court 'recantations.'"), affd, 164 F.3d 1199, 1207 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
because extradition magistrate allowed recantation evidence, "we need not reach the
question whether recantation evidence is admissible in an extradition hearing."); Bobadilla v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (admitting and considering
recantation evidence, but concluding that probable cause exists). Although the outcomes in these cases were favorable to the government, the cases suffer from the same
conceptual infirmities present in the cases in which the outcome favored the accused,
i.e., the extradition magistrates admitted contradictory evidence proffered by the accused and made a credibility determination. See also Sandhu v. Burke, 97 Civ. 4608
(JGK), 2000 WL 191707, at * 16 (Feb. 10, 2000) (remanding for further proceedings
and noting that "the consideration of recantations is consistent with the principle that
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determinations based upon evidence introduced by the accused,
they undermine the premise of the Rule of Non-Contradictionis neither a trial on the merits, nor
that an extradition hearing
87
one.1
become
it
should
Moreover, these cases fail to provide practical standards for
deciding when to enforce the Rule of Non-Contradiction and
when to disregard it. Some recantations are more credible than
original confessions, while other recantations are not. As with
most credibility conflicts, deciding whether a recantation is more
credible than the original confession is best made with the witnesses in court so that the fact finder can observe their deSimilarly, some alibi witnesses are credible while
meanor.'
others are not. Credibility of an alibi witness is best assessed with
the witness before the court.
Moghadam, Contreras, and Maguna-Celaya should not fall
outside of the Rule of Non-Contradiction because they involved
recantations made by the government's own witnesses. Recantation gives rise to an issue of fact as to which of the witness' statements is true-the original accusation or the subsequent recantation. In the domestic context, if a government witness has
given inculpatory testimony before a federal grand jury, only to
recant and to refuse to inculpate the defendant at trial, then the
government is entitled to offer the grand jury testimony at trial
an extradition magistrate may consider evidence that tends to obliterate probable
cause.").
187. See supra notes 18-19, 25, 40, 55, 60, 69 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 545 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The District
Court, after hearing [the government's witness'] recanted testimony and observing his
demeanor, found that [he] had told the truth at trial and that his recanted testimony
was not credible."); see also International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1265 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Only through live cross-examination can the fact-finder observe
the demeanor of a witness, and assess his credibility."); Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 94
n.3 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The case resolves itself into numerous credibility determinations
arising from sharply conflicting testimony. Gray's version may not be believed. However, belief or nonbelief is a function of the finder of fact, not of the judge or magistrate judge."); Wood v. Allstate Insurance Co., 21 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 1994). In
1949, Judge Jerome Frank, writing for a Second Circuit panel that included Judge
Learned Hand, said:
Trial on oral testimony, with the opportunity to examine and cross-examine
witnesses in open court, has often been acclaimed as one of the persistent,
distinctive, and most valuable features of the common-law system. For only in
such a trial can the trier of facts (trial judge or jury) observe the witnesses'
demeanor; and that demeanor-absent, of course, when the trial is by affidavit
or deposition-is recognized as an important clue to the witness' credibility.
Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
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as part of its evidence-in-chief.' 9 The trial jury decides whether
to believe the accusatory testimony or the recantation, taking
into account all of the evidence in the case.' 9 ° In the analogous
extradition context, to allow an extradition magistrate to decide
which version to believe, and to deny extradition if the accused's
evidence is deemed more credible than the government's evidence, improperly pre-empts trial in the requesting country. 19 1
The distinction drawn by the courts in Moghadam, Contreras,
Maguna-Celaya, and Gonzalez-that contradictory evidence is admissible so long as it "negates" or "obliterates" probable causederives from Shapiro and Sindona and their progeny.' 9 2 However, as discussed above,1 93 in neither Shapiro nor Sindona did
the court intend to allow the accused to introduce contradictory
evidence on an "obliteration" or "negation" rationale. If anything, the Sindona court then limited even further the evidence
that an accused could introduce under the Rule. 9"
189. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1) (A); see, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191, 193
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978). This is
subject, of course, to other evidentiary principles such as relevance and competence.
190. See, eg., United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1984) (recanting
was for
witness' "grandjury testimony was admissible as substantive evidence" at trial; "It
the jury to decide whether or not to credit it."); United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d
1018, 1019 (5th Cir. 1978) ("It was for the jury to decide whether" to believe the testimony of "a witness who recants or contradicts his prior testimony...").
191. Nor is there justification based upon the exclusionary rule, even where there
is evidence of coercion, as in Contreras and Maguna-Celaya. As a general matter, the
exclusionary rule does not apply in extradition proceedings, since its purpose is only to
regulate the conduct of U.S. law enforcement officers, not foreign police. See, e.g., In re
Powell, 4 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950-52 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Esposito v. Adams, 700 F. Supp.
1470, 1479 n.9 (N.D. Il1. 1988); Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1980).
Although in a domestic criminal case, an involuntary confession by the accused would
be suppressed and excluded from the evidence at trial, see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972), an indictment may be returned on the basis
of an involuntary or coerced confession. See In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1052
(E.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Tapp, 812 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Rivieccio, 723 F. Supp. 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 24849, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910); see also Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350,
78 S. Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d. 321 (1958); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45
(1974). Cf United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Tate,
329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964). While an argument could be made in the domestic
context that a U.S. court may exercise its supervisory authority and dismiss such an
indictment, U.S. courts have no supervisory authority over foreign proceedings. See,
e.g., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1976).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 105-19.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14.
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Shapiro and Sindona introduced, respectively, the words "obliterate" and "negate" into the formulation of the Rule of NonContradiction. This language led other courts, in adopting the
terminology, to the erroneous principle that contradictory evidence may be admitted if it negates or obliterates probable
cause. Because negation or obliteration via contradictory evidence-such as evidence of recantation or alibi-requires a trial
on the merits to determine credibility, admission of such evidence5 is fundamentally incompatible with U.S. extradition trea9
ties.1
IV. A PROPOSEDSTRUCTURE FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE
Circumstances may arise in which an accused has evidence
so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could reject it.
Such evidence is frequently presented in civil cases. Courts
presented with such evidence in civil cases grant summaryjudg1 96
ment.
This Article proposes an approach to the Rule of Non-Contradiction that draws upon standards of proof for a defendant to
obtain summary judgment in a civil case. Where the accused in
an extradition proceeding has evidence such that, in a civil case,
a court would grant summary judgment in favor of the accused,
the extradition magistrate should admit the evidence-even if it
provides a defense or contradicts the government's proof-and
should rule in favor of the accused. This approach helps ensure
the fairness of the extradition hearing, enhancing its due process function, without transforming the hearing into a trial on
the merits. On the other hand, if the accused's contradictory
evidence merely gives rise to an issue of fact, the extradition
magistrate should adhere to the Rule of Non-Contradiction, and
should exclude the evidence. Only the requesting country's
courts should resolve disputed issues of fact.
The Supreme Court has held that at the summary judgment
stage in civil cases, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."197 "Credibil195. See supra notes 18-19, 25, 40, 55, 60, 69 and accompanying text.
196. See FED. . Civ. P. 56.
197. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

2000]

THE RULE OF NON-CONTRADICTION

1329

ity determinations" are to be made solely by the trier of fact at
trial.1 98 However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no 'genuine issue for trial"' and summary judgment
must be granted. 9 9
These principles are based upon the need to separate cases
that warrant a trial from those that do not. They are consistent
with the function performed by the extradition magistrate, and
should be imported into the law of extradition-with the proviso
that the government in an extradition case need only establish
probable cause, not a prima facie case.2 00 Thus, as a general
198. 1& at 255.
199. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
200. See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199, 205, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (requesting government does not have to prove prima facie case, but need only establish
probable cause); Lindstrom v. Gilkey, No. 98 C 5191, 1999 WL 342320, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
May 14, 1999) ("competent evidence to establish reasonable grounds [to extradite] is
not necessarily evidence competent to convict.") (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268
U.S. 311, 312 (1925)); RESTATE MENT,supra note 162, § 476 comment b (stating that
]
while U.S. law and treaties require showing of probable cause, "[i n Great Britain and
states following the British model, the standard is stricter, equivalent to a prima fade
case"); WHrrEmAN, supra note 14, at 975 (noting distinction between prima facie case
and probable cause in extradition context); HA KwORTH, supra note 87. But cf Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461, 33 S.Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913) ("[tlhe issue is
confined to the single question of whether the evidence for the state makes a prima
facie case of guilt sufficient to make it proper to hold the party for trial."); Collins v.
Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316, 42 S.Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 956 (1922) (referring to accused's
right to explain "ambiguities or doubtful elements in the prima facie case"); In re Shapiro, 352 F. Supp. 641, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("the testimony of the complaining witnesses leaves no doubt that prima facie the offenses asserted in the Statement of Charge
have been made out and call for a trial of the merits."); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 73
(E.D.N.Y. 1915) ("the evidence presented, as found by the judge upon the hearing,
makes out a prima facie case"); BAssiounm, supra note 32, at 713 ("the probable cause
standard is akin to a prima facie standard."). If the evidentiary showing needed to
establish probable cause is less demanding than that needed to make out a prima facie
case, then it is theoretically possible that the accused might have documentary evidence
sufficient to defeat the requesting government's prima facie case but not the government's showing of probable cause. However, if the accused's documentary evidence is
of such probative force that it would have entitled the accused to summary judgment in
the analogous civil context, as a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine how there
would still be probable cause in the face of such evidence. Nevertheless, to allow for
the theoretical possibility, an extradition magistrate presented by the accused with evidence sufficient to grant summary judgment should admit the evidence, and should
nevertheless decide whether, notwithstanding the strength of the accused's evidence,
there is still probable cause to believe the accused committed the crimes charged, taking into account the conceptual distinction (assuming there is one) between a showing
of probable cause and establishing a prima facie case.
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matter, U.S. extradition magistrates should continue to exclude
contrary factual accounts, recantations, alibi evidence, proof of
prior inconsistent statements by the prosecution's witnesses, and
similar evidence that, ordinarily, simply gives rise to an issue of
fact to be determined at trial. Extradition magistrates should,
however, admit unimpeachable evidence, such as a document or
photograph, of a caliber sufficient to grant summary judg20
ment. '
Under the proposed approach, the extradition magistrate
should determine first whether the government's evidence
standing alone suffices to establish probable cause. As in the
summary judgment context, the government at the extradition
hearing is entitled to the benefit of reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from the evidence.20 2 If the government's evidence standing alone does not establish probable cause, then
the government has not met its burden, and the extradition
magistrate must refuse to certify the accused for extradition.
If the government's evidence, standing alone, suffices to establish probable cause, then the extradition magistrate should
next consider whether the government's evidence, taken together with the explanatory and contradictory evidence proffered by the accused, "could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for" the government.2 "3 Proceeding from the premise that
a trial on the merits should only occur in the requesting country,20 4 if the overall effect of the evidence is such that a rational
trier of fact could find for the government, the extradition mag201. For example, if the accused can prove conclusively that he was incarcerated at
the time he is alleged to have robbed a bank, such proof should be admissible and
dispositive even though it contradicts the requesting government's proof and constitutes an alibi defense. On the other hand, if the accused has witnesses willing to swear
that he was with them on the date in question, that merely creates an issue of fact to be
resolved at trial.
202. See, e.g., Shapiro, 352 F. Supp. at 645 (finding probable cause by drawing "the
permissible inference" from evidence "even if no single direct act had been brought
home by any witness to" accused); Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685, 692 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(finding probable cause based upon "all evidence received, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom"), affid sub nom. Ealn v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 688 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (making probable cause determination, relying upon "inferences which are logically drawn from the circumstances presented in the evidence."), affid, 619 F.2d 167
(2d Cir. 1980).
203. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
204. See supra notes 18-19, 25, 40, 55, 60, 69 and accompanying text.
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istrate should disallow the proffered evidence and should certify
the accused for extradition. On the other hand, if the overall
effect of the evidence is such that no rational trier of fact could
find for the government, the accused's evidence should be admitted, and the facts established by the accused's documentary
or other unimpeachable evidence should be found in favor of
the accused.
Courts should generally continue to admit non-contradictory defense evidence that explains the government's proof, irrespective of the strength of that evidence, 20 5 subject to the limitation established by Sindona that the evidence be of "limited
scope ' 20 6 and "reasonably clear-cut"207 so as to avoid a trial on
the merits. It is important to note that this proposal does not
envision the emergence of a substantial new body of case law in
which extradition is denied. Cases in which the accused has evidence sufficient to defeat extradition under the standard proposed in this Article are likely to be few and far between. Before
an extradition request reaches the courts, it is screened by both
2 °8
the Department of State and the Department of Justice.
There is no reason to believe that the U.S. Government wishes to
devote prosecutorial resources to pursuing extradition requests
that can be overcome by incontrovertible proof. Nor is there
any indication in the reported case law that such extradition requests have reached the courts.
While this Article proposes a refinement to the Rule of NonContradiction, the Rule itself should not be jettisoned.
Although the Rule originated in an era that pre-dated routine
intercontinental air travel, 20 9 it is still the case today that there
would be serious hardship to the requesting government and its
205. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
206. Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 685.
207. Id
208. See RESrATEMENT, supra note 162, § 478 comment a; Title 9, United States
Attorney's Manual, § 9-15.700 (1999) (stating that Office of International Affairs of U.S.

Department of Justice "reviews [extradition] requests for sufficiency and forwards appropriate ones to the district" for initiation of extradition proceedings).
209. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461, 33 S. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913);
Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1922); In re Wadge, 15 F. 864, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1883); In re Orteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337 (1890). See also Bingham v. Bradley, 241
U.S. 511, 517 (1916) (requiring "the demanding government to send its citizens to

another country to institute legal proceedings, would defeat the whole object of the
treaty."); In re Farez, 8 F. Cas. 1007, 1012 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) ("Such a result would
entirely destroy the object of such treaties.").
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witnesses were it required to engage in a full-scale trial on the
merits in the requested country. 21 0 As a practical matter, abandoning the Rule of Non-Contradiction would likely compel the
requesting government to present live witnesses at the extradition hearing in order to enable the extradition magistrate to
make a credibility determination. 2 1 In addition to the enormous imposition on civilian witnesses, in many cases, the requesting government's witnesses include convicted felons. The
need to remove them temporarily from the requesting country's
jails and transport them on a civilian passenger aircraft to the
United States in order to testify at an extradition hearing would
provide a serious disincentive to the requesting country to pursue its extradition requests, thereby undermining the entire system of bilateral extradition treaties. It also goes without saying
that the United States would prefer neither to send its felon-witnesses to foreign countries, nor permit the entry of foreign convicts into this country, even under tight security, in order to testify at extradition hearings.
The Rule of Non-Contradiction, however, should not be
viewed by foreign governments as a license to commit perjury.
U.S. extradition magistrates should not allow the Rule of NonContradiction to be exploited by foreign investigators and witnesses to misrepresent facts without fear of contradiction. Nothing in the law of extradition-including the need to avoid a fullscale trial on the merits-mandates that a U.S. extradition magistrate close his or her eyes to outright misrepresentation.
210. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 902 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that
even "in the era of the jet airplane ... the transportation of witnesses thousands of
miles has elements of trouble and expense"); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057,
1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("It would be most difficult for a court in one jurisdiction to seek
to determine factual issues arising in another distant jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, this
constitutes the rationale for requiring that the demanding country to support extradition merely prove reasonable grounds to believe the fugitive guilty.").
211. See, e.g., In re Singh, 124 F.R.D. 571, 577 (D.NJ. 1987) ("[Tlhe Government
would be compelled to produce witnesses here. That is simply too close to the dress
rehearsal trial the Court must avoid."); In re Shapiro, 352 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("[i]t would introduce chaos into extradition proceedings to construe the treaty
so as to require the personal appearance of the complaining witnesses in the state of
asylum."); Wadger 15 F. at 866 (allowing accused to introduce alibi evidence "might
compel the demanding government to produce all its evidence here, both direct and
rebutting, in order to meet the defense thus gathered from every quarter."), Orteiza, 136
U.S. at 337 (quoting Wadge); Letter dated Apr. 20, 1961, from Secretary of State Dean
Rusk to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, reprinted in WBTssA, supra note 14, at
999-1000.
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Where documents, photographs, or similar unimpeachable evidence offered by the accused contradicts the requesting government's evidence, the extradition magistrate should look at that
evidence and decide whether a reasonable fact finder could still
find for the government. If not, then the court should admit the
evidence and should refuse to certify the accused for extradition.
CONCLUSION

The Rule of Non-Contradiction arises out of the need to
prevent extradition hearings from becoming trials on the merits.
Yet, the Rule has the harsh effect of precluding probative, and
perhaps dispositive, evidence offered by an accused. Some
courts, while purporting to endorse the Rule, have found ways to
sidestep it. These decisions are incompatible with U.S. treaty obligations. While the Rule itself should remain in effect, courts
should permit the accused to offer documentary, photographic,
or other evidence that leaves no genuine issue of fact for trial.
Admitting such evidence would not require the U.S. courts to try
extradition cases on the merits, and would enhance the due process function served by the extradition hearing.

